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This paper: i) estimates the effect that going to a better school has on students' academic achievement,
and ii) explores whether this intervention induces behavioral responses on the part of children, their
parents, and the school system. For the first task, we exploit almost 2,000 regression discontinuity
quasi-experiments observed in the context of Romania's high school educational system. For the second,
we use data from a specialized survey of children, parents, teachers and principals that we implemented
in 59 Romanian towns. The first finding is that students do benefit from access to higher achieving
schools and tracks within schools. A second set of results suggests that the stratification of schools
by quality in general, and the opportunity to attend a better school in particular, result in significant
behavioral responses on the part of teachers, parents, and students. Although we do not expect the
magnitude or even the direction of these responses to hold everywhere, their existence has a number
of implications for evaluation, particularly since some of them change over time, and some would
seem to be relevant only once interventions reach a certain scale.
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Whether students would bene￿t from attending higher-achieving schools is an important question
in education. For example, part of the rationale underlying No Child Left Behind is that a child
in a low-achievement institution would be better o￿ transferring to a higher-scoring school. Clear
evidence on this issue is scarce, in large part because students are not randomly allocated to schools.
Nevertheless, as discussed below, several papers provide credible estimates of the e￿ect of having
access to a better school.
Such estimates do not provide a complete roadmap for policy, however, as they may re￿ect
but not reveal behavioral responses that amplify or reduce the impact of educational quality. For
instance, parents might react to their children going to a better school by lowering their own e￿ort.
There might also be reactions on the part of students; for example, an individual who makes it
into a better school might feel inferior or be stigmatized.1 Importantly these responses might
change over time, and may thus in￿uence results di￿erently depending on when outcome data are
collected. Additionally, some of these responses￿which we will refer to as equilibrium e￿ects￿
may only emerge once interventions are taken to scale and sustained for a period of time.
2 To
illustrate, stratifying students by ability might lead to reactions in the school system itself, e.g.,
the emergence of norms that assign more quali￿ed teachers to brighter students. Thus, the very
characteristics of an intervention may depend on its reach. The bottom line, as emphasized by Todd
and Wolpin (2003), is that knowledge of such behavioral responses is crucial to a full understanding
of educational interventions. Yet, there is little evidence on their empirical relevance.
In this context, this paper makes two contributions. First, using administrative data from all
of Romania, it provides a rigorous estimate of the impact of going to a better school. Second, it
explores the existence of dynamic behavioral responses and equilibrium e￿ects using data from a
specialized survey of parents, teachers, and principals that we implemented for three cohorts in a
subset of towns.
As stated, our starting point is that identifying the e￿ect of access to a better school is chal-
lenging. Nonetheless, several analyses have exploited compelling research designs, with Dale and
Krueger (2002), Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006), and Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2009) providing
1 Partially along these lines, Cullen, Jacob and Levitt (2006) explore how school choice a￿ects students’ attitudes
and behaviors.
2 See for example the discussions in Banerjee and Du￿o (2008), Acemoglu (2010), and Deaton (2010).
2early examples. Several more recent papers rely on regression discontinuity (henceforth RD) de-
signs. Speci￿cally, Park, Shi, Hsieh, and An (2008), Hoekstra (2009), Saavedra (2009), and Jackson
(2010a) ￿nd that relative to students who just miss gaining admission to high achieving educational
institutions, those who make it have better academic and/or labor market outcomes. In contrast,
Clark (forthcoming), Du￿o, Dupas, and Kremer (forthcoming), and Sekhri and Rubinstein (2010),
￿nd scant evidence of impacts from getting into a better school or class (within a school).
We also apply an RD design to Romania’s high school system, exploiting the fact that as they
transition into secondary education, Romanian children’s ability to choose a high school depends
solely on a score which is the average of their performance on a nationwide 8th grade test and
their grade point average. After obtaining their transition score, students submit a list of high
school/track combinations they wish to enroll in (such as Mathematics and Social Studies). These
tracks are essentially ￿schools within a school￿ in that their students take all their classes together
and do not take courses with members of other tracks, although they share inputs like facilities and
a principal.
After students have submitted their choices, they are allocated to school/tracks via a nationally
centralized process that honors higher scoring students’ requests subject to pre-established slot
constraints.3 This gives rise to cuto￿ scores that we set equal to the transition score of the child
that ￿lls the last slot in a given school/track. We show that there are clear discontinuities in
educational quality at these cuto￿s. For instance, relative to students who score just below a school
cuto￿, those who score just above experience, on average, a highly signi￿cant increase in the average
transition score displayed by their peers.
Pooling data from three cohorts of entering students, this process generates about 2,000 cuto￿s
and substantial sample sizes. The large number of cuto￿s allows us to explore the heterogeneity of
school e￿ects￿whether being able to attend a more selective school, for example, is more valuable
to a student whose initial performance is high or low￿something that to our knowledge has not
been possible in the previous RD-based research.
We explore the e￿ects of this variation on a ￿high stakes￿ outcome: performance on a Baccalaure-
ate exam. Passing this exam is a requirement for application to university, and the grade is used by
many institutions as an important admission criterion. We ￿nd that students do bene￿t from access
3 As discussed below, the setting gives students incentives to truthfully reveal their preference rankings.
3to higher ranked schools and tracks within schools. Speci￿cally, relative to individuals who just miss
scoring above a school cuto￿, those who succeed display a statistically signi￿cant 0.05 standard de-
viation advantage in Baccalaureate performance.
4 If scaled by the associated improvements in peer
quality, these e￿ects are of a magnitude consistent with some estimates in the literature.
5 These
e￿ects are often larger and more precisely estimated for cuto￿s that occur at higher grade levels.
Having established these results, we turn to exploring behavioral responses. We rely on a spe-
cialized survey we administered to teachers, parents, and students in a subset of towns, in a way
that allows us to match students to their schools and instructors. The resulting data yield evidence
of behavioral responses and equilibrium e￿ects along potentially important dimensions.
For instance, they are consistent with teachers sorting in response to the strati￿cation of students:
teachers with higher certi￿cation standards are more likely to teach in better-ranked schools. This
sorting persists even within schools as one moves from a weaker to a stronger track, and even within
tracks as one moves from a weaker to a stronger class.
6 As a result, although students who score just
above a cuto￿ attend schools that on average have more certi￿ed teachers, the marginal (actual)
teachers assigned to them are not observably di￿erent from those assigned to students who score
just below the cuto￿. In short, more quali￿ed teachers are matched with higher achieving students.
This seems to be an established norm in Romania, perhaps one that re￿ects a long term outcome of
the interplay between teacher and parental preferences, as well as broader political-economy forces.
In terms of parental e￿ort, a ￿rst ￿nding is that children who just make it into higher achieving
schools receive less homework-related help from their parents. In this sense, Romanian parents may
view educational quality and their own e￿ort as substitutes, and this may have real e￿ects once
parents understand a tracking policy and expect it to persist. We also ￿nd areas where there seems
to be no change in parental choices, again leading to di￿erences in average vs. marginal e￿ects.
For example, children who make it into better schools/tracks/classes are exposed to peers whose
parents are signi￿cantly more involved in their education￿they participate more at school, and are
more likely to devote resources to private tutoring (which is common in Romania)￿yet their own
parents show no greater sign of such engagement.
4 In a ￿nding that facilitates the interpretation of this result, there is no signi￿cant evidence of selection into test
taking.
5 For instance, a one standard deviation increase in peer quality is associated with a 0.1-0.2 standard deviation
increase in Baccalaureate grade performance.
6 Stratifying students into classes within tracks (when tracks are large enough) is a common but not universal or
codi￿ed practice in Romanian high schools.
4In terms of student responses, we ￿nd that children who just make it into better schools perceive
themselves as weaker relative to their peers. This is not surprising in a setting in which tracking
by ability has been in place a long time and is well understood. Additionally, however, this is
associated with greater frequency of negative interactions with peers, providing some evidence that
getting into a better school is associated with marginalization.
For the parental and student dimensions, we also ￿nd evidence that these responses have a
dynamic component. Namely, the RD-estimated feelings of stigmatization and reduction in parental
help are strongest earlier in students’ high school careers, and diminish over time. This might re￿ect,
for example, students’ gradual realization that tracking involves some noise, or parents’ realization
that their help is necessary even if their child is in a better school. Such dynamics imply that
the estimated e￿ects of going to a better school might depend, for example, on whether academic
outcomes are measured at the 9th or 12th grade level.
Taken together, these results inform not just the literatures on tracking and school e￿ects, but
also the research on experimental analyses of educational policy. Speci￿cally, while we do not
expect the exact nature or even the direction of the responses we ￿nd to extend to all settings,
our results suggest that large scale interventions can result in equilibrium responses by the di￿erent
actors involved in educational markets. These reactions may not be observed or are explicitly held
constant in partial equilibrium interventions. In salient examples, the STAR class size experiment
(e.g., Krueger (1999)) and the tracking experiment in Du￿o, Dupas, and Kremer (forthcoming)
report on contexts in which one dimension of educational quality was manipulated while teacher
quality was held constant by randomly assigning instructors to classrooms. In our data, in contrast,
relevant measures of teacher quality end up being correlated with educational quality. Similarly,
parental e￿ort may not change in a temporary experiment, but might respond once an intervention
is sustained.
As stated, such behavioral responses and equilibrium e￿ects may well be setting-speci￿c. For
example, Du￿o, Dupas, and Kremer (forthcoming) are aware that teacher sorting could happen,
and point out that in Kenya this would result in more e￿ective teachers being matched to weaker
children. In contrast, Lankford, Loeb, and Wycko￿ (2002) suggest that in the U.S., low-achieving
students are typically matched with the least-skilled teachers. Similarly, while we ￿nd evidence
that Romanian parents view school quality and their own e￿ort as substitutes, other parents might
5view them as complements. Again, our point is not that there would be uniformity in responses
across all settings, but that such responses may be quantitatively important and hence a￿ect the
key characteristics and impacts of an educational intervention. Indeed, the presence or absence
of similar behavioral responses might partially account for the mixed ￿ndings in the growing RD
literature on school e￿ects cited above.
Our work is also related to the literature that studies how families make decisions regarding
human capital investments (Becker (1964), Becker (1981), Becker and Tomes (1986)). The empirical
literature in this area has usually focused on the impact of parental characteristics on child outcomes
(e.g. Behrman et al. (1997), Case and Deaton (1999b), Brown (2006)) without considering parent-
school interactions. Das et al. (2010) is a notable exception that studies how parents adjust their
educational expenditures in response to anticipated and unanticipated school grants. 7
Finally, our results are also relevant for theoretical work suggesting that educational interventions
should ideally be analyzed with reference to their potential e￿ects on the behavior of agents involved
in the educational process, e.g., Das et al. (2010), MacLeod and Urquiola (2009), and Albornoz,
Berlinski, and Cabrales (2010).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a conceptual framework. Sec-
tion 3 describes the student allocation mechanism, and sections 4 and 5 our data and methodology,
respectively. Section 6 presents results, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Conceptual Framework
The range of behavioral responses we focus on can be illustrated with a minor addition to the
useful framework set out in Todd and Wolpin (2003). The addition re￿ects that while Todd and
Wolpin focus on responses on the part of households, here we also consider reactions on the part of
the school sector itself.
Speci￿cally, consider a three period setting in which period t = 0 precedes a child entering school,
and t = 1 and t = 2 denote the ￿rst and second years of school, respectively. Ft stands for household
investments into children’s skill acquisition in period t, and  for a child’s innate ability. W denotes
family wealth. Finally, let At indicate a child’s achievement at the beginning of period t. For
7 A related literature looks at private responses to public transfers (e.g., Mo￿tt (1992), Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1994), Jacoby (2002), and Jensen (2003)). Case and Deaton (1999a) point out that the impact of transfers might
be di￿erent in the short and the long run, since it takes time for private behavioral responses to public transfers to
have an e￿ect.
6example, A1 is a child’s achievement as she enters school in period 1, and re￿ects only her family’s
investments in the previous period and her innate ability:
A1 = g0(F0;)
where gt is a period-speci￿c production function.
Upon enrollment, children’s learning is also enhanced by the school inputs they receive each
period, S1 and S2. Thus, a child’s achievement at the start of the second year of school depends on
endowments and the history of family and school inputs:
A2 = g1(S1;F1;F0;)
Todd and Wolpin (2003) make a useful distinction between the amount of school inputs a child
would receive if this were entirely up to her family, and the amount she actually receives at school.
While families cannot control their children’s school inputs, they can in￿uence their level. In the
U.S., for example, they can do this through residential choice or private schooling; in Romania,
they might help their children prepare for transition exams. Let St denote the amount of inputs
households target by such actions. Households choose this level as a function of their wealth and
their children’s endowment and achievement at the beginning of each period. For example:
S1 = (A1;W;)
Schools in turn can choose how to allocate resources to students. For example, a child making
clear progress towards reading might receive less attention than a struggling one. Additionally,
Todd and Wolpin cite that schools may use prior achievement to ￿track￿ students, a motivation
relevant in our setting. Schools therefore have decision rules; e.g., they condition the inputs a child
receives in period 1 on her achievement at the beginning of that period and on her endowment:
S1 =  (A1;):
With this, the deviation between the level of inputs children actually receive, and the amount
their families had targeted for the ￿rst period is (S1 S1). Assume households observe this deviation
before setting their own home input investment level. For example, for the ￿rst schooling period
they use a decision rule:
7F1 = (A1;W;;S1   S1):
In words, a household sets its own investment for the ￿rst year of school as a function of its child’s
achievement at the beginning of the year, endowments, and the deviation between the school-based
inputs they would want for their child and those she will actually receive (for instance, the child
may not have been admitted to the school they had thought she would attend).
This simple setup illustrates the parameters that di￿erent types of work can identify. For example,
a common goal of research is to answer the question: What would be the e￿ect of exogenously










This is a question about the properties of the production function.
Todd and Wolpin argue that experiments more typically answer the question: What would be the
total e￿ect of an exogenous change in S1, not holding other inputs constant. They refer to the STAR
class size experiment as an illustration, since class size was manipulated exogenously but parents















This is a well-de￿ned and interesting measure, one that in comparison to (2.1) also contains the
indirect (behavioral) e￿ect resulting from changes in parental investments. At the same time, it
has some limitations; for example, cost bene￿t calculations might require ascertaining the relative
contributions of school and family inputs. In addition it is worth noting that although in the present
framework the behavioral response by parents is instantaneous, in real world situations it might take
time for parents to notice and react to changes in school inputs. As a result, the estimated policy
e￿ect (2.2) could vary with the time at which child achievement is measured.
Now consider a second input such that there are two: Sx
1 and S
y
1. A randomized experiment
might be able to vary one of these, say Sx
1, while controlling the level of the other. In that case the
resulting impact will still resemble expression (2.2) This is broadly the way in which we interpret
Du￿o, Dupas, and Kremer (forthcoming). The setting allows the authors to manipulate the peer
8quality of the classes children have access to, while at the same time constraining changes to other
school inputs. For example, teachers are randomly assigned to high or low achieving classes.
Now suppose the increase in Sx
1 originates not in an experiment but from an extensive and











































which di￿ers from (2.2) in also including responses within the school system.
To summarize, Todd and Wolpin (2003) make a useful distinction between production function
parameters (2.1) and policy e￿ects (2.2). We wish to further emphasize that policy e￿ects might be
di￿erent in situations where behavioral responses take time to unfold, or where these responses only
appear when certain interventions reach a certain scale￿(2.3) versus (2.2). A further implication is
that in the presence of behavioral responses, estimated policy e￿ects are less likely to have external
validity, since this also requires the indirect (behavioral) e￿ects to be the same in another setting.
In short, aside from attempting to estimate the policy e￿ect of having access to a better school,
it is precisely the quantitative importance of the behavioral responses on the part of schools and
parents￿terms beyond the ￿rst one in the right hand side of equation (2.3)￿ that we attempt to
uncover below.
3. The student allocation mechanism
The transition between middle and high school (8th to 9th grade) in Romania results in an
unusually systematic and transparent allocation of students to schools. Speci￿cally, every child who
completes middle school receives a transition score which equally weights: 8 i) her performance in a
national 8th grade exam covering Language, Math, and History/Geography, and ii) her gymnasium
(grades 5-8) grade point average.9
After receiving their transition scores, students submit an essentially unlimited list of ranked
choices which specify a combination of: i) a high school, and ii) one of seven academic tracks:
Mathematics, Natural Sciences, Technical Studies, Services, Social Studies, Literature, and Natural
8 During the period we study, schooling in Romania was compulsory until the 10
th grade. As a result the entire
cohort of students who complete middle school is required to participate in this allocation process.
9 All tests and grades use a scale ranging from 1 to 10, with a passing grade of 5. Students who score below 5 are
not allowed to apply to high school, but can enroll in vocational school.
9Resources and Environmental Protection.
10 These tracks constitute ￿schools within a school￿ in
that the students in them take all their coursework together and do not take classes with members
of other tracks￿although they share infrastructure and a principal, meet during breaks, and might
share teachers. Not all schools o￿er all tracks, and some schools o￿er more than one class per track,
with class sizes subject to a cap.
Students’ school/track choices are expressed through an application form submitted (through
their gymnasium) to the Ministry of Education in the capital, Bucharest. Using a computerized
system, the Ministry then allocates individuals into school/tracks, giving priority to higher scoring
students and assigning them their most preferred choices until predetermined school/track capacity
constraints bind.
11 Schools submit their track-speci￿c capacities to the Ministry in advance, and
simply apply the admission lists returned from the capital. Under this set up (in contrast to many
school choice schemes), students have incentives to truthfully reveal their preference rankings.
12
Finally, when a school o￿ers multiple classes of the same track, the system just returns to it the
list of students admitted into the track, without further instructions on how to divide them into
classes. We have data on this division for only a subset of schools (as detailed in the next section);
these data and the anecdotal evidence suggest that many schools further stratify classes by ability.
4. Data
We rely on two types of data: i) administrative information covering essentially the universe of
children who make the middle to high school transition, and ii) data from a survey we administered
in most towns with two or three high schools.
13
10 For the 2001 sample, the administrative data on tracks is not as precise; it combines three of the tracks (Technical
Studies, Services, and Natural Resources and Environmental Protection) into one technical track.
11 No criteria other than students’ stated preferences and their transition scores are used in the allocation process;
for example, there is no role for sibling preference or geographic proximity.
12 Further, all students are required to make at least one active choice in the ￿rst round of the allocation process.
However, some students only request school-track choices with minimum entry scores above their own transition
scores. These individuals are assigned, in a second round process, to schools and tracks that did not ￿ll in the ￿rst
round. Students are warned against this outcome and the associated behavior is relatively rare. For example, in 2007
only 1.1 percent of the applicants were not allocated in the ￿rst round. On a related note, the existing legislation
does not allow children to decline their initial assignment, although in rare situations children do manage to switch
schools and/or tracks over the years. Such switching does not pose a threat to our research design, given that our
￿intent-to-treat￿ empirical strategy is based on the o￿ered school choice.
13 We use the term town to denote high school markets. The term that appears in the administrative data is locality
(Localitate, in Romanian). In most cases these units actually correspond to cities/towns. In a few, they denote the
largest of a number of small towns or villages￿the town which actually contains the high school that might draw from
a corresponding catchment area composed of smaller towns or villages. In all cases, these units should approximate
self-contained (high school) educational markets.
104.1. Administrative data. Our administrative data cover the 2001-2007 admission cohorts. They
provide the name, gymnasium, transition score, and the allocated school/track for all students, but
no information on their ranking of school/tracks or their socio-economic characteristics. We focus
on two subsamples of these administrative data:
(1) The 2001-2003 cohorts, for which we linked admissions data with information on whether
students took the Baccalaureate exam and how they performed (these cohorts took the
exam in 2005-2007).
14 As stated, a satisfactory Baccalaureate grade is a prerequisite for
applying to university, and an excellent one essentially guarantees admission to the most
prestigious institutions.
15 These cohorts contain about 334,000 students attending about
800 high schools in 135 towns.
(2) The 2005-2007 cohorts, for which we have only admissions information and can thus only
explore ￿￿rst stages￿. This subsample consists of 301,000 students’ originating in essentially
the same schools and towns; it contains the students we surveyed, as described below.
Presenting descriptive statistics, Table 1 thus covers the universe of students admitted to high
school during these years, with three exceptions. The ￿rst two re￿ect that, as explained below, we
rank schools and set cuto￿ scores under the assumption that towns are self-contained markets. We
therefore omit the capital, Bucharest, which is composed of six towns the borders of which students
can cross with relative ease. We do not ￿nd this omission to a￿ect our key conclusions. Second,
when our analysis focuses on between-school cuto￿s, we omit towns that have only one high-school.
16
Finally, we drop all students who enroll in the vocational sector; this precludes their access to higher
education and hence we do not observe Baccalaureate outcomes for them.
17 After these exclusions,
Table 1 presents summary statistics at the individual, track, school, and town level.
14 We merged the admission and Baccalaureate data by student name and county using a fuzzy matching technique to
allow for some misspelling of names. Our conclusions are not sensitive to di￿erent levels of precision in the matching
algorithm, and are also similar if we restrict the analysis to exact matches. Our matched data do not allow us to
di￿erentiate between high school drop-outs and students who complete high school but do not take the Baccalaureate
exam. Additionally, students are generally not allowed to take the Baccalaureate exam early, but those who fail the
exam are allowed to retake it.
15 The Baccalaureate exam is a comprehensive test administered nationally. Students usually take six component
exams, with a combination of common subjects (written language, oral language, written foreign language) as well
as two track-speci￿c exams and one elective exam. All the tests are graded on a scale from 1 to 10 and the overall
Baccalaureate grade is the unweighted average of these scores.
16 Despite these omissions, for simplicity we will describe the sample as covering ￿all towns￿ unless we focus only on
those towns covered by our specialized survey.
17 For analyses of vocational education in Romania, see Malamud and Pop-Eleches (forthcoming).
114.2. Survey data. While the administrative data sets o￿er substantial sample sizes, they contain
only basic information. To explore behavioral responses, we therefore carried out a survey that
included principal, parent, and student questionnaires.
The way in which we carried out this survey partially explains our ￿nal survey sample, and we
therefore begin with a brief description of its implementation. The 2005-2007 administrative data
described above provided students’ names, but not their addresses or any way of contacting them
or their parents. The data also contained almost no information regarding school characteristics.
We therefore approached schools and asked their principals/administrators to ￿ll a school survey,
and to provide us with the addresses of the students in the mentioned cohorts (who were still
in school at the time). The school survey collected information on the student population, and
on school resources and infrastructure. The principals were also asked to provide a subjective
ranking of their school￿relative to other schools in their towns￿along dimensions like teacher
quality, student ability, and parental involvement. Our surveyors also collected administrative data
on the experience, education and certi￿cation levels of the teachers responsible for seven subjects:
Math, Romanian, History, Geography, Music, Sports and Computer Science. Each teacher was later
matched to the students in the household survey based on who (by name) the students indicated
were their teachers in these subjects.
During the ￿rst half of 2009, we used the list of addresses to directly approach parents and
students at home. The survey we administered to them had three components. First, we interviewed
the family to obtain demographic information on each member of the household, as well as basic
household characteristics. Second, we surveyed the primary caregiver to elicit information on each
child in the family. Third, we conducted a separate interview with the child from the selected
school. Both the parental and the child surveys included questions on parent-child relationships,
school performance and school experiences, an evaluation of the child’s teachers, and a range of
questions about child and family well being.
Two factors determined that we restricted our target sample to towns containing two or three
schools. First, since we needed information from students on either side of admissions cuto￿s, it
was imperative that all schools in each town agree to participate, and therefore the e￿ort was more
likely to encounter problems in larger towns. Second, as shown below the administrative data reveal
that the magnitude of the ￿rst stages is three to four times as large in smaller towns. We therefore
12started with an initial sample of 57,534 children and 167 schools in the 71 towns with two or three
schools. If any school in a given town declined to participate, we simply abandoned the whole town.
In the event, we obtained complete school surveys and student data from 148 schools in 63
towns; the administrators in these schools provided us with 32,307 addresses. We restricted the
target sample further to 138 schools in 59 towns, which contained 30,676 children.
18 Due to ￿nan-
cial constraints we randomly sampled 19,878 children (about 65 percent of the total) out of this
population. From this target sample, we obtained 12,590 parent and child surveys. Our response
rate of 63 percent, is in line with Gallup Romania’s (the ￿rm we contracted with) interview rate for
this population. While the resulting sample is not completely representative of the population of
these schools, we found no evidence that response rates di￿ered between households whose children
had a transition score just above a cuto￿, and their counterparts who scored just below.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics from the survey data, using the household and school
questionnaires. We return to further discussion of its entries in the results section below.
5. Empirical strategy
Although in principle a student can request any high school in the country, we suppose that
students restrict their choices to the towns they live in, a reasonable assumption since the applicants
are 13-14 year olds likely to still be living with their parents. Within each town, we rank schools
and school/tracks (in separate exercises) according to their average score, and set the cuto￿s equal
to their minimum scores.
19 In other words, we set each school’s (or school/track’s) cuto￿ equal to
the transition score of the child that ￿lls its last slot, where as stated the number of available slots
are announced by schools prior to the admissions process.
This yields a large number of quasi-experiments￿1,984 if one considers schools; 6,434 if one
considers school/tracks￿since each cuto￿ score in our sample makes for a potential RD analysis. In
this section we ￿rst discuss the conceptual basis for analyzing any given one of these experiments,
focusing on schools for simplicity. We then describe how we go about summarizing them.
5.1. Empirical setup for a single between-school cuto￿. Consider a town in which i indexes
students and s = 1;...;S indexes schools, where the latter have been ordered from the worst to
18 The elimination of four towns re￿ected that at least one school in each of them, though willing to ￿ll out the school
questionnaire, was unable to provide student addresses.
19 We also implemented the exercise ranking schools and tracks by their minimum score, with quite similar results.
13the best in terms of the average transition score observed among their students. Additionally, let
z = 1;...;(S   1) index cuto￿s, such that, for example z = 1 denotes the cuto￿ between the worst
and next-to-worst school in a town, and z = (S   1) indicates the cuto￿ between the top-ranked
school and the next best institution. Let Ti stand for the average transition score among student i’s
peers (i.e., the average score among the children at her school), and let ti denote the student’s own
transition score. Finally, let tz be the minimum grade required for admission into the higher-ranked
of the two schools indexed by z.
In this setup, consider the regression:
(5.1) Ti=a1ftit1g + a(ti) + ui
where 1fti  t1g is an indicator for whether a student’s transition score is greater than or equal
to the cuto￿ which determines access into the next-to worst school (cuto￿ z = 1), and a(ti) is a
￿exible control function for the transition score. In this case, a estimates by how much students’
peer groups improve, on average, when their score is just above rather than just below t1.
The idea behind RD designs, originally proposed by Thistlewaite and Campbell (1960), is that
discontinuities like those measured by a can be used to identify the causal e￿ect of scoring above a
cuto￿ even if students’ transition scores are systematically related to factors that a￿ect outcomes
like Baccalaureate grades.20 Intuitively, suppose the transition score is smoothly related to char-
acteristics that a￿ect achievement. Under this assumption, students with scores just below t1 will
provide an adequate control group for individuals with scores just above, and any di￿erences in
their outcomes can be attributed to the fact that they have access to schools of di￿erent quality.
Speci￿cally, one can run a reduced form regression analogous to (5.1) to explain outcomes like
Baccalaureate performance, which we denote Yi:
(5.2) Yi = b1ftit1g + a(ti) + vi
Again, if in a small enough neighborhood around the cut-o￿, a(t) is constant, then the e￿ect
of achieving access to the next to worst school, b, is non-parametrically identi￿ed at t1 (Hahn,
Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001). More generally, if a(t) is speci￿ed correctly, it will capture all
dependence of the Baccalaureate grade on the transition scores away from the cut-o￿, and one can
20 For an overview of the RD design, see Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
14use all the data to estimate (5.2). Below we will present such results, but also estimates that rely
only on observations close to cuto￿ scores.
Finally, in addition to studying the impacts on Baccalaureate outcomes, we consider how a series
of behaviors and/or characteristics on the part of students, parents, teachers, principals, and schools
change as one crosses the cuto￿s. For example, in a speci￿cation like (5.2), we ask if relative to
children who score just below t1, those who who score just above are more likely to have teachers
who are certi￿ed, or parents who help with homework.
5.2. Summarizing information for many cuto￿s. Speci￿cations (5.1) and (5.2) explain how
one might exploit one regression discontinuity￿that arising from the hypothetical transition from
the worst to the next-to worst school in a given town. In fact, as stated our data contain 1,984
such between-school cuto￿s, and 6,434 between-track cuto￿s. 21 Below, we present information that
exploits this wealth of quasi-experiments, exploring, for example, how the impact of scoring above
a given cuto￿ varies with where in the transition test score distribution these cuto￿s are located.
However, in order to summarize these data and for the sake of statistical power, we ￿rst report
regressions in which we pool data across cuto￿s. For this, we normalize each cuto￿ score, z, to zero,
and create a variable that measures the distance between each cuto￿ and the transition score of
each student in a town. In some cases we then ￿stack￿ the resulting data such that every student
in a town serves as an observation for every cuto￿, and (since individual level observations are used
more than once) run the analyses clustering at the student level.22 Including all student observations
for every cuto￿ is relevant in that, for example, the student with the best score in town could in
principle attend any school she wanted. We note, however, that regressions restricted to students
in bands close to the cuto￿s in fact rarely use student-level observations more than once.
6. Results
This section ￿rst presents results that pool all the between-school and between-track cuto￿s. It
then turns to describing the heterogeneity in e￿ects observed when discontinuities take place at
21 The between-school cuto￿s are 663, 655, and 666 for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 entry cohorts, respectively; for the
between-track cuto￿s, the corresponding numbers are 1,956, 1,952, and 2,526.
22 To illustrate, in the ￿rst year of our data, 2001, the ￿rst town in our data, Alba-lulia, has 836 students in 7 schools,
producing 6 between-school cuto￿s. For that year, this produces a data set of 5,016 (=836*6) observations, with
similar calculations for the other two years of data.
15di￿erent points of the transition score distribution. Finally, it closes with exercises that, using our
survey data, explore behavioral responses.
6.1. The ￿rst stage. Figure 1, Panel A illustrates the basic ￿rst stage result in our data, pooling
all between-school cuto￿s as described in Section 5. The x-axis describes students’ transition scores
relative to the cuto￿s (normalized to zero) that allow the opportunity to access a better school;
the y-axis describes the peer quality students experience, as measured by the mean transition score
at their respective school. Panel A plots this mean transition score collapsed into cells containing
individuals who are within 0.01 of a transition grade from each other. The right hand side Panel
B plots analogous information, but the y-axis is based on residuals from a regression of the mean
transition score on a linear trend in students’ transition grade and a series of cuto￿ ￿xed e￿ects.
23
Both panels suggest that the average peer quality students experience increases signi￿cantly and
discontinuously if their transition score crosses the threshold that gives them the option of going
to a better school. The vertical distance between the points close to the discontinuity, further, is
analogous to the estimate of a in expression (5.1).
Table 3, Panel A presents the regression analog to these results, where columns 1-3 refer to all
the towns in our sample. Panel A refers to the 2001-2003 admissions cohorts, those for which we
have Baccalaureate outcomes. Column 1 uses about 3.6 million observations from 1,984 cuto￿s
observed across the three cohorts. It regresses the average transition grade that students experience
at school on an indicator for whether their scores are above cuto￿s. The speci￿cation includes: i) a
linear spline in students’ grade distance to the cuto￿s, one which allows the slope to vary on each
side of the cuto￿, and ii) cuto￿ dummies analogous to those used in Figure 1, Panel B.
24 The key
estimate suggests that scoring above a cuto￿ results in a highly statistically signi￿cant jump in the
peer quality students experience￿0.09 points, which is equivalent to about 0.1 standard deviations
in transition test performance.
Column 2 restricts the sample to include only students whose transition scores are within 1 point
of a cuto￿, reducing the number of observations to about half of those in Column 1. This is our
preferred speci￿cation, as it attempts to balance the goal of focusing on observations close to the
cuto￿s while providing enough data to yield fairly precise estimates. We experimented with several
23 Figures 1-9 all have a similar structure in that the left hand side panels use raw data, and the right hand side
panels use residuals based on regressions that control for a linear trend in the transition grade and cuto￿ ￿xed e￿ects.
24 We note that these and all the following results are not qualitatively a￿ected by instead using a linear, quadratic,
or cubic speci￿cation for a(ti) in (5.1), or by excluding the cuto￿ ￿xed e￿ects.
16more stringent windows, with similar conclusions.
25 We opt to feature, in Column 3, a regression
within the bandwidths suggested by the procedure in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) (henceforth
IK), which in our data is generally more restrictive than the 1 point band used in Column 2.
26 In
the event, all these samples result in similar and highly signi￿cant estimates of .
Columns 4-6 repeat the speci￿cations in columns 1-3 using the same administrative data, but
focus only on towns included in our specialized survey￿most towns with two or three schools, as
described in Section 4. The corresponding graphical evidence for the survey towns is in Figure 2,
panels A and B. The observed discontinuities are always statistically signi￿cant, and about four
times the size of those observed in the full sample.
The ￿￿rst stages￿ in Table 3, Panel A are those that will be relevant for the Baccalaureate
outcomes.27 They show that the Romanian high school admissions process provides a clear ￿rst
stage for an RD analysis of the impact of having access to a better school, at least if school quality
is judged by average transition scores.
28 Below we will explore other dimensions along which school
characteristics vary at the cuto￿s.
Recall that in applying for high school slots students choose school/track combinations, and so the
between-track cuto￿s also provide candidate ￿rst stages. Figure 3 (panels A and B) present these
using the same speci￿cations as panels A and B in ￿gures 1 and 2. The corresponding regression
results are presented in panel B of Table 3. In all cases the coe￿cient of interest is somewhat smaller
(although always statistically signi￿cant) than that observed for the between school cuto￿s.
This is consistent with some sorting happening between-tracks within schools, with the implica-
tion being that students who just make it into a higher ranked school will indeed experience better
peers, but that this will be more the case if the measure is the average score of their school-level
rather than their track-level classmates. Panel C in Table 3 con￿rms this expectation, as it uses the
track level average transition grade students experience as a dependent variable, and explores how
25 For example, a previous version of the paper focused on only the administrative data (which o￿er substantial
sample sizes) featured speci￿cations that for each cuto￿ used only the two students immediately to the left and right.
26 Speci￿cally, we follow Lee and Lemieux (forthcoming) and use a simple rectangular kernel. Further,
we implemented the bandwidth selection procedure using the Stata ado ￿le labeled rdob.ado available at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/imbens/software\_imbens.
27 For the sake of space, we omit very similar results for the 2005-2007 cohorts.
28 Aside from ￿rst stage results like those described in Table 3, the RD approach requires that there be no discrete
changes in other student characteristics that a￿ect outcomes like Baccalaureate performance. While our adminis-
trative information does not contain such variables, our survey data suggest this condition is ful￿lled. Speci￿cally,
Appendix Table A.1 shows that a number of background characteristics (mother’s age, mother’s ethnicity, mother’s
education, child age, and child gender) do not vary discontinuously around the grade cuto￿ once we consider estimates
within 1 point and IK bandwidths (all but two of the nine estimates are also insigni￿cant in the full sample).
17it changes at the cuto￿s that determine access to a higher ranked school. The observed estimates
are still highly signi￿cant, but as expected are smaller those observed when peer groups are de￿ned
at the school level (panel A).
In order to elaborate on how these ￿rst stage results originate, and because it is relevant for later
interpretation, we note that while scoring above a cuto￿ gives students a chance to attend a better
school, not all of them take up the opportunity. Speci￿cally, panels A and B in (Appendix) Figure
A.1 summarize information regarding the cuto￿s that determine access to fairly selective schools,
namely those that separate the best and second-best school (cuto￿ z = S   1 in the notation of
Section 5) in towns that contain at least three schools. Panel A plots transition score cell means
of the percentage of students who attend the best school, and not surprisingly this is equal to zero
when students’ scores are to the left of the cuto￿￿these students are not eligible to attend the most
selective school in their town. While the proportion of students in the best school jumps discretely
once one moves to the right, it does not rise to one; rather, roughly 40 percent of children eligible
for enrollment in the best school take advantage of the opportunity. Panel B, which plots the
percentage of individuals in the second best school, shows that about 25 percent of those eligible for
the best decide to remain in the second-best school, with another 35 percent attending institutions
other than the top two.29
Multiple factors (e.g. proximity) may account for why not all students take up the chance to
go to the best school they are eligible for, an aspect we discuss further below. Whichever ones are
actually operative, Figure A.1 underlines that results generated using the ￿rst stages in Table 3
should be interpreted in an ￿intent to treat￿ spirit.
30
6.2. Baccalaureate outcomes. A ￿rst outcome we consider is simply whether students took the
Baccalaureate exam. Panels C and D in Figure 1 present the graphical evidence for the 2001-2003
cohorts￿the ones for which we have Baccalaureate data￿and suggest few if any changes in test-
taking rates at the cuto￿s. This is con￿rmed in regressions in Panel A of Table 4, where columns 1-3
refer to the full sample of towns. The coe￿cient of interest suggests that getting the opportunity to
go to a better school resulted in small and (except for the ￿rst speci￿cation) statistically insigni￿cant
29 A related note is that all regressions exclude the child whose score was exactly equal to the cuto￿, since that
student may be selected. This re￿ects that this student’s score dictates the cuto￿ score and, mechanically, that
student attends the better school with probability one, which is empirically not the case with the individuals right
above him or her. This exclusion does not have a qualitative e￿ect on any of our conclusions.
30 For further reference, panels C and D in Figure A.1 show analogous evidence for the cuto￿s separating the worst
and the next to worst schools in each town; panels E and F plot similar information for towns with only two schools.
18changes in the probability of taking the Baccalaureate exam. The results within bands allow us
to rule out di￿erences in test-taking rates of less than a third of a percentage point. In short, the
opportunity to enroll in a better school does not seem to a￿ect the likelihood that students take
the Baccalaureate test.
A generally similar conclusion emerges among the towns in our survey sample (Figure 2, panels
C and D and Table 4, Panel A, columns 4-6) and when we analyze the opportunity to enroll in a
better track (Figure 3, panels C and D, and Table 4, panel C).
31 This consistent lack of evidence of
selection into test taking makes it easier to interpret e￿ects on Baccalaureate performance.
Turning to this issue, panels E and F in Figure 1 describe grade outcomes at the cuto￿s, suggesting
a discrete increase in average achievement, particularly in Panel F. The corresponding regression
evidence is in Panel B of Table 4, which presents statistically signi￿cant gains equivalent to about
0.02 to 0.10 standard deviations, depending on whether one looks at the full or the survey sample.
32
The bottom line is that students who score above cuto￿s giving them access to a better school
perform better in the high stakes Baccalaureate exam, and under the assumptions underlying RD
designs, this impact can be viewed as causal. A similar conclusion emerges when looking at the
towns covered in our specialized survey (Figure 2, panels E and F, and Table 4, Panel B, columns
4-6), and when one considers between-track rather than between school cuto￿s (Figure 3, panels E
and F, and Table 4, Panel D). The magnitude of the e￿ects on test performance is greatest in the
survey towns, which is consistent with the larger ￿rst stage estimates observed there (Table 3).
6.3. Heterogeneity in Baccalaureate outcomes. The results presented thus far pool all between
school and between track cuto￿s. We now explore how the Baccalaureate e￿ects vary according to
where the cuto￿s are located in the transition score distribution. To provide a visual summary of
the results, Figure 4 presents evidence on the ￿rst stages observed in the top (panels A and B) and
bottom terciles (panels C and D) of between-school cuto￿s if these were ordered according to the
grades at which they happen. These panels reveal that the discontinuities in average peer quality
are of a roughly similar magnitude in both sets of cuto￿s. At a ￿rst pass level, students seem as
interested in attending the best schools as they are in getting out of the worst.
31 In contrast to Table 3, Table 4 no longer has columns 7-9. Again, this re￿ects that for the 2005-2007 cohorts we
do not have Baccalaureate outcomes, so these variables are not available for the children we surveyed.
32 As stated, if scaled by the peer improvements in Table 3, these estimates are of a magnitude similar to some observed
in the literature on peer e￿ects. To further explore this we could run instrumental variable-type speci￿cations where
peer quality is instrumented by students’ position relative to the cuto￿. We refrain from this, however, because as
the results below show, many factors other than peer quality change at the cuto￿s.
19Panels E-H present the graphical evidence on Baccalaureate performance.
33 Speci￿cally, panels
E and F suggest that gaining admission to a better school￿when the cuto￿ in question is in the
top third of cuto￿s￿raises testing performance. Panels G and H point to a similar, if less precisely
estimated e￿ect among the bottom cuto￿s.
Table 5 explores these and other points related to heterogeneity. For the sake of space, this
table presents only speci￿cations using observations within one point of the cuto￿s, and focuses on
the between-school cuto￿s. To illustrate, Panel A refers to the full sample of cuto￿s and repeats
results presented above. Column 1 presents the ￿rst stage (from Table 3, Panel A, Column 2).
Within Panel A, column 2 features the track level average transition score as a dependent variable,
and columns 3 and 4 a dummy for taking the Baccalaureate exam, and performance on this test,
respectively.
Within Table 5, panels B and C refer to the top and bottom tercile of cuto￿s. Column 1 shows
that the ￿rst stages are of about 30 percent larger for the top tercile. Comparing columns 1 and
2 con￿rms that as observed in the aggregate sample, when children get the opportunity to enroll
in a better school, their track-level peer groups do not improve as much as their school-level peer
groups. Turning to the heterogeneity in Baccalaureate e￿ects, Column 3 shows that the lack of an
e￿ect on test taking persists in all the subsamples. The coe￿cients are never statistically signi￿cant
at the ￿ve percent level, and are still generally suggestive of only small impacts on test taking rates.
In contrast, the estimates surrounding Baccalaureate performance (Column 4) generally suggest
a positive impact from having the opportunity to attend a higher ranked school. The magnitude
of the e￿ect is larger and only signi￿cant in the top tercile, but cannot be clearly distinguished
from that in the bottom tercile, which is itself statistically insigni￿cant.
34 The bottom line is that
gaining access to a better school might be valuable to both high and low-scoring children, but
statistical power constrains our ability to explore such heterogeneity. More generally, school e￿ects
are di￿cult to identify, and sample size issues alone might account for some of the variation in
conclusions observed in the literature.
6.4. Behavioral responses. Using our survey of principals, parents, and children, we now inves-
tigate whether a major educational intervention like giving a child access to a better school (or
33 We omit the evidence on test taking because there is again no evidence of an e￿ect along this dimension.
34 The two e￿ects would be particularly di￿cult to tell apart in IV speci￿cations which would account for the larger
￿rst stages in the top tercile.
20introducing tracking altogether) might lead to behavioral responses. It is important to note that
our analysis does not attempt to determine to what extent speci￿c factors (e.g., parents, teach-
ers, or peers) account for the impact that attending a better school has on children’s academic
achievement.
35
To present results in this area, we make some notes on the structure of all remaining tables (6-11)
and ￿gures (5-9). In each table, Panel A aggregates outcomes to the school level; Panel B aggregates
them to the track level, and Panel C presents them at the child or parent level. For example, in
Table 6 one dependent variable is an indicator for whether Language teachers passed a certi￿cation
exam. Panel A thus compares the children who scored just above a threshold with those who scored
just below, and asks if on average their schools have more certi￿ed language teachers; Panel B asks
if the tracks they are in are more likely to have certi￿ed teachers; Panel C asks if their own teacher
is more likely to be certi￿ed.
36 Note that the variables from the principal survey only vary at the
school level, so Panels B and C are blank for them. As before, for each variable we present three
speci￿cations, where our preferred one is that restricted to individuals within one transition grade
from the cuto￿; we usually use these when discussing the results. Finally, here we focus only on the
top cuto￿s. Among our survey towns, this restriction is relevant only for those with three schools
(19 of the 59 towns in the sample), as the two school towns of course contain only one cuto￿.
37
As above, in all ￿gures the panels on the left hand side present simple means of the outcome
variables, while the right hand side panels show ￿tted values of residuals from regressions of outcomes
on a linear trend in transition scores and cuto￿ ￿xed e￿ects. Since we have fewer observations in
the survey data, the cells that we plot are within 0.05 of a transition score from each other. In each
￿gure, panels A and B are aggregated to the school level, C and D to the track level, and E and F
are at the student/parent level.
6.4.1. Teacher characteristics. Figure 5 and Table 6 describe the impact that scoring above a school
cut-o￿ has on the teacher characteristics that students experience. The ￿rst three columns of Table
6 show that students above the cuto￿ are about 13 percent more likely to attend a school which the
35 Econometrically this would be hard to do without strong assumptions, given that we have one source of exogenous
variation in the treatment (attending a better school), and many variables that might account for this e￿ect (e.g.,
teacher, school, parent, and peer e￿ects).
36 An individual student’s outcome can be di￿erent from that observed in his track because some schools feature
multiple classes within a track. Our survey asked each student for his or her Language teacher’s name, and we used
that to match students to teachers and teacher characteristics as supplied by the school based on administrative data.
37 This restriction re￿ects that the di￿erence in peer quality between the bottom two schools in three school towns
was small.
21principal declares has the best teachers in town. The remaining columns describe Language teacher
quali￿cations as provided by their schools based on administrative records.
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The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is an indicator for whether teachers have attained the
highest certi￿cation standard￿a credential that about 60 percent of teachers in Romania have.
Panel A shows that relative to those who just miss, students who score above a school cuto￿ attend
schools where on average Language teachers are about 10 percent more likely to have reached this
standard. Panel B shows this e￿ect is reduced to about 3 percent when one looks at the tracks
students are enrolled in. Panel C shows that the e￿ect essentially disappears once one considers
the actual teachers assigned to students￿those just above a cuto￿ are not more likely to have a
certi￿ed teacher than those just below.
This conclusion is also visible in Figure 5, where Panel A shows a sharp discontinuity in the
school-level probability of Language teachers having the highest certi￿cation standard. Panel B
shows signi￿cantly smaller discontinuities at the track level, and panel C suggests no discontinuity
in terms of the actual teacher students encounter.
In short, in terms of teacher certi￿cation di￿erences between schools exist on average, but these
di￿erences disappear when one considers the actual teachers experienced by students at the margin.
This is consistent with teachers sorting both across and within schools in a way clearly associated
with student strati￿cation. For example, the pattern of results could re￿ect the highest certi￿cation
teachers having a preference for￿and through seniority gravitating towards￿the highest academic
ability children. Consistent with this columns 7-9 (Table 6) reveal a similar pattern when teacher
quality is measured using years of experience.
However, it is worth noting that di￿erences at the margin persist for some of our measures of
teacher quality. Columns 10-12 show that attending a better school decreases the probability of
having a ￿novice￿ teacher (one with two or fewer years of experience) not just on average, but also
on the margin.
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6.4.2. Parental e￿ort. Table 7 and Figures 6 and 7 describe the impact that being able to attend a
better school has on measures of parental involvement and e￿ort. We focus on measures of parents’
38 We focus on Language teachers since all children in all tracks take this subject.
39 On average teachers have about 15 years of experience, with only six percent having less than two years.
22participation at school and also on variables intended to capture their interactions with their own
children, such as the willingness to help with homework or pay for tutoring services.
40
The ￿rst six columns of Table 7 indicate that children above cuto￿s attend schools where parents
are on average more involved at school. This emerges both in principals’ reports of parental partic-
ipation (columns 1-3, Panel A) and in parents’ self-reports on volunteering (columns 4-6, Panel A).
However, the impacts at the track and individual level become small and statistically insigni￿cant
(columns 4-6, panels B and C). Figure 6 con￿rms that there is a discontinuity in parental volunteer-
ing at the school level, but not at the parent level. As was the case with teacher characteristics, this
implies di￿erences between the average and marginal parental e￿ort: Children who score just above
cuto￿s have peers whose parents participate more at school, but their own parents do not partic-
ipate more than those of children who score just below. A similar conclusion emerges in columns
7-9, where we use the frequency of parental expenditures on tutoring as the outcome variable.
However, there is evidence of parental behavioral responses in other dimensions. Table 7 considers
the extent to which they help their children with homework. Columns 10-12 (Panel A) point to
no di￿erences at the cuto￿s on the average likelihood that parents help on a daily or almost-daily
basis. This might not be surprising given that the need for help might depend on children’s academic
ability. However, the most striking result is shown in Panel C, as well as in Panel F of Figure 7￿a
reduction in average parental help with homework for children just above cuto￿s. This suggests
that at least in our setting, parents might view their own e￿ort and school quality as substitutes.
6.4.3. Interactions with peers. Section 6.1 showed that children who score above cuto￿s are on
average exposed to peers that have higher average transition scores. This ￿rst stage is con￿rmed
and expanded upon by columns 1-3 of Table 8, which measure peer quality using principals’ ranking
of student quality among schools within their towns.
According to the often cited linear-in-means model, which assumes homogeneous treatment ef-
fects, these ￿ndings would imply positive peer e￿ects for the children who make it into a better
school.
41 However, scoring above a cuto￿ could adversely impact children if their relative ability
40 To illustrate the variation in these dimensions, 11 percent of parents report that during the last year, they
volunteered in their child’s classroom, school o￿ce, or library. About 24 percent of parents report having paid for
private tutoring lessons, a common practice in Romania. In addition, roughly 20 percent of parents claim to help
with homework on a daily or almost daily basis. Finally, we note that secondary education is free in Romania; hence
we do not consider tuition expenses as a measure of parental e￿ort.
41 Peer e￿ects have been a focus in the educational literature, with a large number of papers attempting to empirically
determine their presence and functional form (for instance, see Hoxby and Weingarth (2006), Lavy, Paserman, and
Schlosser (2007), and Jackson (2010b)).
23ranking matters, since this makes them ￿a small ￿sh in a big pond.￿ Indeed, models which stress
relative comparisons suggest negative e￿ects through a reduction in con￿dence and/or self-esteem.
To explore this possibility, we ￿rst investigate whether children who score just above cuto￿s
actually perceive being lower in their peer ability distribution. Columns 4-6 explore this by running
regressions in which children are asked about their rank within their track. The responses ranged
from 1 to 7 with higher numbers indicating a better rank in terms of academic ability. Panels A-B
in columns 4-6 show that on average children in better schools are more likely to feel they are strong
relative to their peers, and as might be expected if they have over-optimistic views, the coe￿cient
is positive rather than zero. More interestingly Panel C con￿rms that in contrast, children who
score just above cuto￿s rank themselves lower than those who score just below￿the coe￿cients
are negative (and also signi￿cant) in this case. This might not be surprising given that Romania’s
student allocation system is well understood by most students.
Finally we explore whether such feelings of inferiority are associated with the nature of children’s
interaction with their peers. We measure this using an index of negative interactions that averages
four indicators for whether children report that, in the last month, their peers have: i) been mean to
them, ii) hit them, iii) taken their things without asking, or iv) made them feel marginalized. The
possible responses for each of these items ranged from zero (happened daily) to 5 (did not happen
at all); the average of 4.87 across all four indicators suggests that these events are relatively rare.
The results in Table 8 (columns 7-9) do not reveal average di￿erences at the school level. However,
the track and most importantly the individual level provide evidence of more frequent negative
interactions for children who score just above cuto￿s, a pattern con￿rmed by the graph in Panel F
of Figure 8. In short, these results leave open the possibility that getting into a better school might
result in feelings of insecurity or marginalization. It is also possible that the realization of such
e￿ects is behind the fact that not all students take up the opportunity to enroll in a more selective
school (Figure A.1).
6.4.4. Student e￿ort. Finally, we explore e￿ort responses on the part of students.
42 Our variables
of interest are indicators for whether students did homework daily or almost daily in the month
prior to the survey, an assessment of which our survey solicited from both parents and the children
42 In results not reported in the paper, we have also explored how enrollment in higher-ranked school a￿ects students’
access to educational infrastructure. We ￿nd no signi￿cant di￿erences in infrastructure availability at all three levels
of aggregations, a result that holds for both principal and student reports. This is not a surprising outcome in
Romania, where essentially all schools are public and in principle similarly equipped.
24themselves. The results are presented in the ￿rst six columns of Table 9, where Panel A suggests that
students in better schools do more homework on average, suggesting higher e￿ort in such settings.
In this case this e￿ect persists on the margin at least for the parental reports, which suggest a 5
percent increase in the probability of doing homework on a daily or almost daily basis.
43 Finally,
columns 7-9 show that while on average children at better schools perceive homework to be easier,
the coe￿cient ceases to be statistically signi￿cant and changes sign at the margin, suggesting that,
perhaps not surprisingly, marginal children encounter more di￿culty with homework at higher-
ranked schools￿this may be yet another reason not all children attend the highest-ranked school
they are eligible for.
6.5. Within track analysis. Thus far, we have focused on the reduced-form e￿ects of having the
chance to attend a better school or track within a school. This is a natural ￿rst approach given
that students apply for high school/track combinations. In this section, we consider the e￿ects of
being able to enroll in a better class within a given track.
Speci￿cally, the Ministry of Education stipulates that after students are admitted to a particular
track within a school, they should be allocated to classes containing at most 28 students.
44 In fact
the track-speci￿c slot availabilities which schools submit prior to the allocation process need to be
multiples of 28. Since the Ministry does not specify how the allocation of students to classes within
tracks is to be implemented, each school decides its own allocation. Our survey data suggest that
many schools further stratify children into classes based on their transition scores.
45
To estimate the e￿ect of having access to a better class (within a track), we focus only on tracks
which had slot o￿erings that were multiples of 28 (i.e. 56, 84, 112, etc.), and which were also
completely ￿lled at the time of the admission process.
46 We ranked the students in these tracks
in descending order based on their transition scores, and calculated class level cuto￿ scores based
on the transition score of the 28th (or 56th or 84th, etc.) student. As above, we normalized the
transition scores relative to the cuto￿s, and stacked the data by keeping, on each side of a particular
43 The results on children’s homework e￿ort are con￿rmed graphically in Figure 9.
44 After being allocated to a particular class, students usually spend the next four years with the same peers, taking
all subjects together.
45 In anecdotal evidence, our conversations with headmasters con￿rm that many schools have this policy.
46 As mentioned earlier, our identi￿cation strategy is based on the fact that the majority of schools reach their
pre-announced capacity constraint. At the same time, it is worth mentioning that enrollment in many of the less
desirable schools is often less than the number of initial slot o￿erings.
25cuto￿, the 28 students within a track with scores closest to the cuto￿. Also as above, our analysis
focuses on intent to treat estimates of scoring above a particular class level cuto￿. 47
Understanding these e￿ects is interesting for two reasons. First, by looking at children in di￿erent
classes but in the same track, we are able to make comparisons between children who are exposed
to the same curriculum. These results therefore provide a robustness check for our school and track
level analysis, in which we cannot control for potential curriculum di￿erences. Second, considering
classes allows us to analyze behavioral responses in a setting that even more closely approximates the
experimental setting of Du￿o, Dupas, and Kremer (forthcoming), where an RD analysis compares
students who are on the margin of being assigned to low or high achieving classes.
Table 10 presents the results at the class (Panel A) and child or parent level (Panel B). For
variables that do not vary within classes, such as class-level peer quality or teacher quali￿cations,
the results in both panels are identical and are therefore presented only once. Column 1 begins by
illustrating the ￿￿rst stage￿ showing that there is a clear discontinuity in classroom peer quality at
the class cuto￿s. An increase of 0.13 points in the average transition emerges from a regression using
observations within 1 point of the transition score cuto￿s. Although the e￿ect is highly signi￿cant,
its magnitude is about half the size of the track-based estimates, and about one fourth the size of
the school-based estimates. This re￿ects that there is signi￿cantly less variability in the transition
scores between classes within school/tracks.
Columns 2-4 (Table 10) consider the same teacher characteristics examined in Table 6. The
evidence suggests that teacher sorting is also prevalent across classes in a school/track. Students
who score above a class cuto￿ are exposed to teachers who are 5 percent more likely to have the
highest certi￿cation and have 1.8 more years of experience.
48
The remaining columns present all the other outcome variables featured in our previous analysis
of the survey data (measures of parental participation, children’s interaction with peers, and child
homework e￿ort) with results that are qualitatively similar to those found in Tables 7-9. For
example, although the parent of the child who just makes it into a better class is not more likely
to pay for tutoring services, this child is more likely to be exposed to peers whose parents buy
such services. At the same time, several key coe￿cients in this table, especially the marginal
47 Again, while not every school in our sample allocates children to classes based only on the transition score, as long
as a fraction of schools do so, we can estimate the e￿ects of being able to attend a better class within a track.
48 The small and insigni￿cant result on novice teachers (Column 4) is not surprising given the results in Table 6,
which suggested no di￿erence in this dimension across tracks.
26e￿ects in Panel B, are imprecisely estimated, which could be explained both by the smaller sample
sizes and the fact that the di￿erences in educational environments (as seen in Column 1) are less
stark than in the school or track level analysis. Nevertheless, the bottom line is that many of the
behavioral responses we observed previously￿particularly the sorting of more quali￿ed teachers to
better classes￿can also be observed across classes within the same track.
6.6. E￿ects across cohorts. Finally, we investigate whether the behavioral responses identi￿ed
have a dynamic component: For example, do students’ responses emerge only gradually during
their high school years? This matters because such dynamics suggest that the estimated e￿ects of
experimental or quasi-experimental analyses may vary depending, for example, on when in students’
careers post-test scores are collected.
For the sake of space, Table 11 focuses only on speci￿cations including students within one
transition score point of the cuto￿s. For reference, Panel A repeats speci￿cations at the student
level from previous tables. For example, the dependent variable in Column 2 is the Language teacher
experience measured in years. The coe￿cient (-0.625) is from Table 6, Column 8, Panel C, and
shows there is no change (at the cuto￿ ) in the experience of the teacher students experience.
Panel B explores whether these e￿ects vary with time by looking at how they change across the
three entry cohorts we surveyed: 2005, 2006, and 2007. This comparison allows us to explore if
there are di￿erences according to whether students are in their second, third, or fourth year of high
school. This is achieved by including an indicator for whether students’ transition scores were above
the cuto￿ and interacting this dummy with indicators for the 2005 and 2006 cohorts, such that the
￿rst coe￿cient refers to the 2007 (the youngest) cohort.
The results contain some interesting variation. For example, columns 6 and 7 suggest that
children’s feelings of academic inferiority, and the frequency of their negative interactions with
peers, are more marked in earlier stages of high school. This might not be surprising to the extent
that the transition scores contain noise, and therefore the children ranked lowest upon entry are
unlikely to on average turn in the worst performance during the year. As this information is revealed
students’ self assessment their and peers perceptions might change, a￿ecting behavior.
Similarly, the reductions in parental help with homework happen early on and are partially
reversed by the senior year. Speci￿cally, in column 5 the key coe￿cient is signi￿cant for the youngest
27cohort (2007), but the joint test for the oldest cohort (2005) is not statistically signi￿cant (p-
value=0.29). This might be consistent, for example, with parents gradually realizing that their
child’s admission into a better school might not eliminate the need for support on their part.
Consistent with this, Column 4 shows that while the parents of children who just make it into
more selective schools are not more likely to invest in tutoring in the second year of high school,
by the fourth they are in fact more likely to do so. If tutoring indeed raises academic achievement
(e.g. Banerjee, Cole Du￿o, and Linden, 2007) then this e￿ect might contribute towards ￿nding
school e￿ects by the fourth but not the second year. Finally, columns 2 and 3 show less evidence of
variation across cohorts in terms of teacher characteristics.
To summarize, we also ￿nd evidence that in Romania some of the behavioral responses identi￿ed
above have a dynamic component. This is relevant, for example, because it implies that the esti-
mated e￿ects of going to a better school might depend on whether academic outcomes are measured
at the 9th or 12th grade level.
7. Conclusion
In ￿elds ranging from Labor to Development Economics, distinct interest surrounds the impact
of educational quality on individual outcomes. This impact has not been fully established mainly
because it is di￿cult to ￿nd situations in which otherwise comparable students enroll in schools of
di￿erent quality.
In this paper, our ￿rst contribution has been to address this obstacle by analyzing Romania’s ed-
ucational system, which allocates students to high schools in one of the most systematic procedures
observed around the world. This mechanism yields a large number of RD-based quasi-experiments,
and has enabled us to contribute to the literature with unusually large sample sizes and an explo-
ration of the heterogeneity in e￿ects at di￿erent points of the test score distribution. Our second
contribution has been to implement a specialized survey in a subset of towns, and to use the re-
sulting data to explore behavioral responses and equilibrium e￿ects that arise when a child has the
opportunity to attend a better school￿in this case in a school system where children are strati￿ed
by ability.
Our ￿rst reduced form result is that access to a better school has a positive impact on cognitive
outcomes as measured by a high-stakes exam. This result has not been a consistent ￿nding in the
28literature, as some papers￿including some which also rely on an RD approach￿￿nd little indication
that enrolling in a higher-achievement school or class raises learning.
Our second set of results provides evidence of signi￿cant behavioral responses and equilibrium
e￿ects. Speci￿cally, we ￿nd that teachers sort in response to the strati￿cation of students, such
that an individual who just makes it into a more selective school is assigned a teacher who is less
quali￿ed than the average instructor at the school, and possibly no di￿erent than the teacher she
would have encountered at the school she just avoided. This teacher sorting may be an equilibrium
outcome that has developed over time in this strati￿ed school system. Similarly, while children
who make it into a better school encounter greater average parental participation, there is little
evidence that their own parents increase their commitment to education, and in fact there is some
indication that they reduce the extent to which they help with homework. Along the same lines,
while children who make it into better schools are exposed to better peers, they also seem to realize
they are weaker and to feel marginalized. For the behavioral responses by parents and children, we
also provide evidence that these e￿ects have a dynamic component￿the estimates depend on how
many years the child has attended a particular school.
While the magnitude or even the direction of these responses may re￿ect institutions that are
speci￿c to Romania, their existence suggests that (perhaps as one would expect) educational markets
are sophisticated arenas in which several agents interact. As a result, the causal mechanisms that
link any given school input to outcomes like wages or learning are likely to be complicated.
This has implications regarding the experimental evaluation of educational interventions. This
research typically relies on partial equilibrium experiments that attempt to hold constant factors
including responses like those explored here; additionally, it often measures outcomes in the short
run. If dynamic behavioral responses are relevant, however, then the very nature (and impact) of a
given intervention may change as actors have a chance to respond. Further, some of these responses
may only be observed when an intervention is taken to scale and sustained. These possibilities
amplify the usual concerns regarding small scale experiments’ external validity.
More broadly, our ￿ndings imply that educational interventions and educational institutions
should be analyzed with reference to how their design a￿ects the behavior of di￿erent agents involved
in the educational process. This point is explored theoretically in recent work including MacLeod
and Urquiola (2009), Das et al. (2010), and Albornoz, Berlinski, and Cabrales (2010)).
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Figure 1:  Between-school cutoffs, all towns 
Note: All panels are based on administrative data for the 2001-2003 admission cohorts, and restrict 
observations to individuals with transition scores within 0.2 points of a cutoff (normalized to zero in all 
cases).  The left hand side panels plot (0.01 point) transition score cell means of the dependent variable.  
The right hand side panels plot analogous means of residuals from a regression of the dependent variable 
on a linear trend in the transition score and cutoff fixed effects. In each panel, the solid lines are fitted 
values of regressions of the dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score, estimated separately 
on each side of the cutoff.  The dependent variable in panels A and B is the average transition score of the 
peers students encounter at school; the dependent variable in panels C and D is an indicator for having 





































-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff
























-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff





















-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff













-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff






















-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff











-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff
Panel F: Baccalaureate grade--controls 
 33
Figure 2:  Between-school cutoffs, survey sample towns  
Note: All panels are based on administrative data for the 2001-2003 admission cohorts, and restrict 
observations to individuals with transition scores within 0.2 points of a cutoff (normalized to zero in all 
cases).  The left hand side panels plot (0.01 point) transition score cell means of the dependent variable.  
The right hand side panels plot analogous means of residuals from a regression of the dependent variable 
on a linear trend in the transition score and a cutoff fixed effects. In each panel, the solid lines are fitted 
values of regressions of the dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score, estimated separately 
on each side of the cutoff.  The dependent variable in panels A and B is the average transition score of the 
peers students encounter at school; the dependent variable in panels C and D is an indicator for having 
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Figure 3:  Between-track cutoffs, all towns 
 
Note: All panels are based on administrative data for the 2001-2003 admission cohorts, and restrict 
observations to individuals with transition scores within 0.2 points of a cutoff (normalized to zero in all 
cases).  The left hand side panels plot (0.01 point) transition score cell means of the dependent variable.  
The right hand side panels plot analogous means of residuals from a regression of the dependent variable 
on a linear trend in the transition score and cutoff fixed effects. In each panel, the solid lines are fitted 
values of regressions of the dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score, estimated separately 
on each side of the cutoff.  The dependent variable in panels A and B is the average transition score of the 
peers students encounter at school; the dependent variable in panels C and D is an indicator for having 









































-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff























-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff































-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff

















-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff
























-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff













-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Score distance to cutoff
Panel F: Baccalaureate grade--controls 
 35
Figure 4:  Top and bottom terciles of between-school cutoffs 
Note: All panels are based on administrative data for the 2001-2003 admission cohorts, and restrict 
observations to individuals with transition scores within 0.2 points of a cutoff (normalized to zero in all 
cases).  The left hand side panels plot (0.01 point) transition score cell means of the dependent variable.  
The right hand side panels plot analogous means of residuals from a regression of the dependent variable 
on a linear trend in the transition score and cutoff fixed effects. In each panel, the solid lines are fitted 
values of regressions of the dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score, estimated separately 
on each side of the cutoff. Panels A, B, E and F refer to the top tercile of between-school cutoffs ordered by 
the scores at which they take place; panels C, D, G, and H to the bottom tercile.  The dependent variable in 
panels A-D is the average transition score of the peers students encounter at school; the dependent variable 
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Figure 5:  Teacher certification 
Note: All panels are based on survey data for the 2005-2007 admission cohorts, and restrict observations to 
individuals with transition scores within 1 points of a cutoff (normalized to zero in all cases).  The left hand 
side panels plot (0.05 point) transition score cell means of an indicator for whether teachers have attained 
the maximum certification standard.  The right hand side panels plot analogous means of residuals from a 
regression of the dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score and cutoff fixed effects. The 
solid lines are fitted values of regressions of the dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score, 
estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. Panels A and B present the outcome variable aggregated to 
the school level, and panels C and D present it aggregated to the track level. Panels E and F present the 
























-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Score distance to cutoff


























-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Score distance to cutoff
























-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Score distance to cutoff


























-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Score distance to cutoff


























-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Score distance to cutoff





























-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Score distance to cutoff
Panel F: controls - student level 
 37
Figure 6:  Parental volunteering at school  
Note: All panels are based on survey data for the 2005-2007 admission cohorts, and restrict observations to 
individuals with transition scores within 1 points of a cutoff (normalized to zero in all cases).  The left hand 
side panels plot (0.05 point) transition score cell means of an indicator for whether parents have 
volunteered at school in the past year.  The right hand side panels plot analogous means of residuals from a 
regression of the dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score and cutoff fixed effects. The 
solid lines are fitted values of regressions of the dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score, 
estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. Panels A and B present the outcome variable aggregated to 
the school level, and panels C and D present it aggregated to the track level. Panels E and F present the 
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Figure 7: Parental help with homework 
Note: All panels are based on survey data for the 2005-2007 admission cohorts, and restrict observations to 
individuals with transition scores within 1 points of a cutoff (normalized to zero in all cases).  The left hand 
side panels plot (0.05 point) transition score cell means of an indicator for whether, in the month before the 
survey, parents declare helping their children with homework on a daily or almost daily basis.  The right 
hand side panels plot analogous means of residuals from a regression of the dependent variable on a linear 
trend in the transition score and cutoff fixed effects. The solid lines are fitted values of regressions of the 
dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score, estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. 
Panels A and B present the outcome variable aggregated to the school level, and panels C and D present it 
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Figure 8:  Negative interaction with peers at school 
Note: All panels are based on survey data for the 2005-2007 admission cohorts, and restrict observations to 
individuals with transition scores within 1 points of a cutoff (normalized to zero in all cases).  The left hand 
side panels plot (0.05 point) transition score cell means of an index of children’s negative interactions with 
peers at school (Section 4).  The right hand side panels plot analogous means of residuals from a regression 
of the dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score and cutoff fixed effects. The solid lines 
are fitted values of regressions of the dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score, estimated 
separately on each side of the cutoff. Panels A and B present the outcome variable aggregated to the school 
level, and panels C and D present it aggregated to the track level. Panels E and F present the outcome 
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Figure 9:  Children’s homework effort (parental report) 
Note: All panels are based on survey data for the 2005-2007 admission cohorts, and restrict observations to 
individuals with transition scores within 1 points of a cutoff (normalized to zero in all cases).  The left hand 
side panels plot (0.05 point) transition score cell means of an indicator for whether, based on parental 
reports, children do homework on a daily or almost daily basis.  The right hand side panels plot analogous 
means of residuals from a regression of the dependent variable on a linear trend in the transition score and 
cutoff fixed effects. The solid lines are fitted values of regressions of the dependent variable on a linear 
trend in the transition score, estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. Panels A and B present the 
outcome variable aggregated to the school level, and panels C and D present it aggregated to the track level. 
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Note: This table describes data covering the universe of Romanian towns with two exceptions (discussed in Section 4):  i) towns that make up Bucharest, and ii) 
towns that contain a single school.  Panel A.1 presents student level statistics for the 2001-2003 cohorts.  Panels A.2, A.3, and A.4 refer to characteristics at the 
track, school, and town level, respectively.  Panels B.1-B.4 present analogous information for the 2005-2007 cohorts. 
Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max N
Panel A.1:  Individual level 
Transition grade 7.68 0.80 5.90 9.52 107,812 7.87 0.75 6.03 9.41 110,912 7.96 0.97 5.13 10 115,413
Baccalaureate taken 0.847 0.360 0 1 107,812 0.822 0.383 0 1 110,912 0.809 0.393 0 1 115,413
Baccalaureate grade 8.31 0.93 5.19 10.00 87,411 8.28 0.95 5.18 10.00 85,946 8.51 0.88 5.27 10.00 84,110
Panel A.2:  Track level
9th grade enrollment 62.6 49.0 1 276 1,722 66.6 50.6 1 280 1,665 71.5 53.3 1 329 1,615
Panel A.3:  School level 
9th grade enrollment 135.3 61.4 2 352 797 140.6 63.1 9 420 789 144.1 69.2 3 432 801
Number of tracks 2.2 1.2 1 5 797 2.1 1.2 1 5 789 2.0 1.2 1 5 801
Panel A.4:  Town level
9th grade enrollment 804.6 849.6 62 3,819 134 827.7 875.5 60 4,088 134 854.9 919.5 45 4,169 135
No. of schools 5.9 6.0 2 29 134 5.9 5.8 2 28 134 5.9 5.9 2 29 135
No. of tracks 12.9 11.9 2 58 134 12.4 11.4 2 56 134 12.0 10.9 2 52 135
Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max N
Panel B.1:  Individual level
Transition grade 8.14 0.80 6.50 9.64 105,737 8.26 0.76 6.41 9.67 98,647 8.39 0.77 3.68 9.74 97,069
Baccalaureate taken n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Baccalaureate grade n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Panel B.2:  Track level
9th grade enrollment 62.8 47.8 1 308 1,684 60.4 44.3 1 280 1,634 59.1 42.4 3 252 1,644
Panel B.3:  School level
9th grade enrollment 129.4 70.6 2 420 817 120.3 64.8 1 336 820 116.8 62.2 3 308 831
Number of tracks 2.1 1.2 1 5 817 2.0 1.2 1 5 820 2.0 1.2 1 5 831
Panel B.4:  Town level
9th grade enrollment 766.2 839.8 45 3,767 138 720.1 764.6 46 3,650 137 683.5 728.5 57 3,462 142
No. of schools 5.9 6.0 2 32 138 6.0 6.2 2 34 137 5.9 6.0 2 33 142
No. of tracks 12.2 11.4 2 58 138 11.9 11.2 2 60 137 11.6 10.9 2 59 142
High school admission cohort
2001 2002 2003
2005 2006 2007 
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Table 2:  Descriptive statistics, survey data  
Mean Std. Dev. N
Panel A: Socioeconomic characteristics (Household survey)
Female head of household 0.112 0.316 11,931
Age of household head 46.752 7.145 11,843
Ethnicity of household head
   Romanian 0.938 0.240 11,931
   Hungarian 0.050 0.218 11,931
   Gypsy 0.003 0.056 11,931
   Other 0.008 0.091 11,931
Education of household head
   Primary 0.665 0.472 11,840
   Secondary 0.205 0.404 11,840
   Tertiary 0.130 0.337 11,840
Female Child 0.584 0.493 11,931
Age of Child 18.077 0.939 11,866
Panel B: Parental responses (Household survey)
Parent has volunteered at school in the past 12 months 0.111 0.314 11,868
Parent has paid for tutoring services in the past 12 months 0.237 0.425 11,850
Parent helps child with homework every day or almost every day 0.197 0.398 11,815
Child does homework every day or almost every day 0.752 0.432 11,779
Panel C: Child responses (Household survey)
Relative rank among peers (1-7, with 7 better ranked) 4.745 1.300 11,798
Index of negative interactions with peers
1 4.879 0.369 11,838
Child does homework every day or almost every day 0.632 0.482 11,908
Child perceives homework to be easy (1-7, with 7 easiest) 5.450 1.015 9,628
Panel D: Language teacher qualifications 
        (school data matched to children) 
Proportion of  teachers with highest state certification 0.608 0.488 11,169
Years of experience 15.801 12.228 11,169
Proportion of teachers who are "novices" (less than 2 years of experience) 0.061 0.238 11,169
 
Notes:  This table describes a specialized survey collected in 135 schools among 59 towns for the 2005-
2007 admissions cohorts (see Section 4).   
1 Index based on the sum of four indicators for whether, during the past month, children’s peers: i) were 
mean to them, ii) hit them, iii) took their things without asking, or iv) made them feel marginalized. Each 
indicator ranges between 0 (happened daily) and 5 (did not happen in the past month).  
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Table 3:  First stages 
Dependent variable:








(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.817 0.790 0.792 0.729 0.754 0.754
N 3,609,572 1,857,376 1,160,458 64,052 39,363 39,104








(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.873 0.857 0.857 0.779 0.792 0.793
N 8,802,699 4,845,812 4,400,772 265,896 172,656 154,366








(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.870 0.849 0.852 0.783 0.811 0.812
N 3,609,572 1,857,376 1,160,458 64,052 39,363 39,104











(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.830 0.808 0.811 0.669 0.700 0.691 0.700 0.700 0.700
N 3,302,846 1,611,388 1,822,434 62,503 34,855 22,485 11,838 6,559 6,382
All towns Survey towns
Administrative data
(7) (8) (9) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IK
of cutoff bound of cutoff bound of cutoff bound
Within Within
sample 1 point IK sample 1 point IK sample 1 point
Survey data
Full Within Within Survey towns Within Within Full
 
Note:  All regressions are clustered at the student level and include cutoff fixed effects.  All panels present reduced 
form specifications where the key independent variable is a dummy for whether a student’s transition score is greater 
than or equal to the cutoff (normalized to zero).   
 44
Table 4: Effects on Baccalaureate taking and performance 
Dependent variable:
Panel A: Bacc. taken dummy - 2001-2003 cohorts - between school cutoffs
1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff} 0.001
*** 0.000 0.001 0.021
*** 0.012 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Linear spline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.056 0.054 0.059 0.086 0.081 0.080
N 3,609,572 1,857,376 1,160,458 64,052 39,363 39,104








(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Linear spline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.567 0.483 0.472 0.566 0.494 0.494
N 2,546,208 1,256,038 840,750 44,115 25,393 25,201
Panel C: Bacc. taken dummy - 2001-2003 cohorts - between track cutoffs
1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff} -0.005
*** -0.001 -0.001 0.007
* 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Linear spline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.060 0.057 0.059 0.091 0.084 0.086
N 8,802,699 4,845,812 4,400,772 265,896 172,656 154,366








(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Linear spline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.567 0.490 0.506 0.559 0.495 0.498










sample sample 1 point
(4)
Within Within
All towns Survey towns
Full Full Within Within
 
Note:  All regressions are clustered at the student level and include cutoff fixed effects.  All panels present reduced 
form specifications where the key independent variable is a dummy for whether a student’s transition score is greater 





Table 5:  Heterogeneity in Baccalaureate effects (all specifications within 1 point of cutoffs) 





(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Linear spline Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.790 0.849 0.054 0.483
N 1,857,376 1,857,376 1,857,376 1,256,038





(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Linear spline Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.749 0.816 0.028 0.448
N 756,141 756,141 756,141 579,566




(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
Linear spline Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.459 0.549 0.050 0.222












(4) (1) (2) (3)
score
 
Note:  All regressions are clustered at the student level and include cutoff fixed effects.  All panels present reduced 
form specifications where the key independent variable is a dummy for whether a student’s transition score is greater 
than or equal to the cutoff (normalized to zero).  For comparison, panel A replicates the I-K bound specifications in 
tables 3 and 4.  Panels B and C present analogous specifications for the top and bottom tercile of cutoffs, respectively.   
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Table 6:  Teachers 
Dependent variable:













(0.039) (0.028) (0.033) (0.035) (0.025) (0.028) (0.596) (0.490) (0.522) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.380 0.490 0.470 0.570 0.610 0.600 0.590 0.600 0.580 0.510 0.600 0.590
N 11,431 6,290 7,380 11,084 6,065 6,736 11,084 6,065 6,825 11,084 6,065 6,128
Panel B: Track level
1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff} 0.048 0.026 0.037 0.508 -0.076 0.118 -0.018 -0.036
*** -0.027
(0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.914) (0.878) (0.913) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.410 0.480 0.450 0.380 0.410 0.370 0.340 0.450 0.390
N 11,084 6,065 7,977 11,084 6,065 8,978 11,084 6,065 8,305
Panel C:  Student/parent level
1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff} 0.026 -0.005 -0.011 -0.074 -0.625 -1.077** -0.012 -0.036
*** -0.026
**
(0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.444) (0.539) (0.496) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.320 0.370 0.370 0.300 0.310 0.300 0.270 0.360 0.340






experience in years (less than two years experience)
IK sample
Principals perceive their school to be  Language teacher has the Language teacher Language teacher is a "novice"
sample IK




Full Full Within Within
(3) (12)
bound bound











Note:  All regressions include cutoff fixed effects. The regressions in Panel A are clustered at the school-cohort level, the regressions in Panel B are clustered at 
the school-track-cohort level, and the regressions in Panel C are clustered at the student level.  All panels present reduced form specifications where the key 
independent variable is a dummy for whether a student’s transition score is greater than or equal to the cutoff (normalized to zero). Panel A presents outcome 
variables that are aggregated at the school level. Panel B presents outcome variables that are aggregated at the track level. Panel C presents outcome variables 




Table 7: Parents 
Dependent variable:










*** -0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.055) (0.044) (0.042) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.460 0.480 0.490 0.730 0.710 0.700 0.770 0.750 0.750 0.720 0.740 0.730
N 11,047 6,139 5,558 11,776 6,522 7,142 11,757 6,501 7,255 11,723 6,488 9,674
Panel B: Track level





(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.470 0.490 0.470 0.590 0.550 0.560 0.480 0.500 0.500
N 11,776 6,522 7,606 11,757 6,501 5,363 11,723 6,488 7,141
Panel C:  Student/parent level
1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff} -0.001 -0.002 0.007 -0.009 -0.003 -0.003 -0.021 -0.043
** -0.033
**
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.170 0.130 0.130 0.080 0.090 0.090












(5) (6) (1) (7) (3)
Parents help child
the best in parental participation in the past year services for child with homework often
Principals perceive their school to be  Parents have volunteered
Within Within Within



















Note:  All All regressions include cutoff fixed effects. The regressions in Panel A are clustered at the school-cohort level, the regressions in Panel B are clustered 
at the school-track-cohort level, and the regressions in Panel C are clustered at the student level.  All panels present reduced form specifications where the key 
independent variable is a dummy for whether a student’s transition score is greater than or equal to the cutoff (normalized to zero). Panel A presents outcome 
variables that are aggregated at the school level. Panel B presents outcome variables that are aggegated at the track level. Panel C presents outcome variables that 
are at the child or parent level (see Section 6.4 for further discussion).   
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Table 8:  Peers 
Dependent variable:







*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.005
(0.052) (0.045) (0.046) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.450 0.470 0.470 0.670 0.690 0.680 0.660 0.690 0.690
N 11,733 6,513 6,737 11,708 6,478 8,264 11,745 6,500 6,612




*** -0.010 -0.012 -0.014
(0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.500 0.520 0.520 0.450 0.480 0.490
N 11,708 6,478 9,666 11,745 6,500 8,162








(0.046) (0.059) (0.051) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.170 0.120 0.130 0.070 0.080 0.080
N 11,708 6,478 9,009 11,745 6,500 8,289
Principals perceive their school to be  Child's perception of his/her
Full
of cutoff
Child's experience of negative
Full Full Within Within Within Within






sample IK sample IK 1 point 1 point
bound
sample
(7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (6)
bound
 
Note:  All regressions include cutoff fixed effects. The regressions in Panel A are clustered at the school-cohort level, the regressions in Panel B are clustered at 
the school-track-cohort level, and the regressions in Panel C are clustered at the student level.  All panels present reduced form specifications where the key 
independent variable is a dummy for whether a student’s transition score is greater than or equal to the cutoff (normalized to zero). Panel A presents outcome 
variables that are aggregated at the school level. Panel B presents outcome variables that are aggegated at the track level. Panel C presents outcome variables that 
are at the child or parent level (see Section 6.4 for further discussion).   
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Table 9:  Child homework 
Dependent variable:









(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.730 0.770 0.750 0.750 0.760 0.760 0.730 0.760 0.750
N 11,815 6,544 8,262 11,689 6,471 6,584 9,556 5,468 6,557







*** 0.045 0.011 0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.570 0.610 0.600 0.600 0.640 0.630 0.510 0.560 0.550
N 11,815 6,544 8,565 11,689 6,471 6,793 9,556 5,468 6,478
Panel C:  Student/parent level
1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff} 0.020 0.024 0.019 0.081
*** 0.051
** 0.046
** -0.023 -0.021 -0.020
(0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.042) (0.053) (0.047)
Linear spline  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.160 0.180 0.170 0.170 0.200 0.190 0.120 0.140 0.130
N 11,815 6,544 9,999 11,689 6,471 7,177 9,556 5,468 7,042
homework to be easy
Child does homework every day Child does homework every day Index:  Child perceives
or almost every day (child report)
Full Within Within Within Within



















Note:  All All regressions include cutoff fixed effects. The regressions in Panel A are clustered at the school-cohort level, the regressions in Panel B are clustered 
at the school-track-cohort level, and the regressions in Panel C are clustered at the student level.  All panels present reduced form specifications where the key 
independent variable is a dummy for whether a student’s transition score is greater than or equal to the cutoff (normalized to zero). Panel A presents outcome 
variables that are aggregated at the school level. Panel B presents outcome variables that are aggegated at the track level. Panel C presents outcome variables that 




Table 10:  Class effects (all specifications within 1 point of cutoffs) 
Dependent variable:
Child does Child does Child
homework homework perceives
almost almost  homework
every day every day to  be
(child report) (parent report) easy
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)









(0.017) (0.021) (0.500) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.019) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.02)
Linear spline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.890 0.560 0.600 0.530 0.560 0.740 0.590 0.620 0.520 0.720 0.700 0.620
N 5,396 5,179 5,179 5,179 5,362 5,346 5,349 5,342 5,350 5,385 5,355 4,443
Panel B:  Student/parent level
1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff} -0.008 -0.001 -0.012 -0.142
*** -0.018 0.003 0.010 -0.032
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.047) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.042)
Linear spline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.120 0.250 0.120 0.200 0.100 0.240 0.230 0.190











































Note:  All regressions include cutoff fixed effects. The regressions in Panel A are clustered at the school-class-cohort level and the regressions in Panel B are 
clustered at the student level. All panels present reduced form specifications where the key independent variable is a dummy for whether a student’s transition 
score is greater than or equal to the cutoff (normalized to zero). Panel A presents outcome variables that are aggregated at the class level. Panel B presents 
outcome variables that are at the child or parent level.  
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Table 11:  Marginal effects across cohorts 
Dependent variable: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)







(0.018) (0.539) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.059) (0.019)
Bandwidth within 1 point of cutoff Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.700 0.310 0.360 0.130 0.090 0.120 0.080
N 6,559 6,065 6,065 6,501 6,488 6478 6500







(0.022) (0.688) (0.014) (0.020) (0.026) (0.075) (0.025)
1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff}*cohort2006 0.043* 0.384 -0.024 0.013 0.018 -0.012 -0.002
(0.024) (0.738) (0.016) (0.021) (0.028) (0.083) (0.025)
1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff}*cohort2005 -0.060
** 0.047 -0.004 0.065
** 0.037 0.103 0.031
(0.024) (0.775) (0.015) (0.026) (0.027) (0.083) (0.027)
Bandwidth within 1 point of cutoff Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.700 0.310 0.360 0.130 0.090 0.120 0.080
N 6,559 6,065 6,065 6,501 6,488 6,478 6,500
p_Statistic (1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff} 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.49 0.08 0.02 0.02
     +1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff}*cohort2006=0)
p_Statistic (1{Trans. grade≥Cutoff} 0.00 0.31 0.01 0.16 0.29 0.42 0.29






































Note:  All regressions are clustered at the student level and include cutoff fixed effects.  All panels present reduced form specifications where the key 
independent variable is a dummy for whether a student’s transition score is greater than or equal to the cutoff (normalized to zero). Panel A presents outcome 
variables that are aggegated at the child or parent level. Panel B  presents outcome variables that are at the child or parent level and it also includes interactions of 
for being in the 2005 and 2006 entry cohort with the dummy for whether a student’s transition score is greater than or equal to the cutoff.  
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Table A.1:  Continuity checks 
Mother's  Mother Mother Mother Mother has  Mother has  Mother has  Child Gender  Child's 
birthyear is is is  has  has  has  gender birthyear
Romanian Hungarian Roma primary secondary tertiary
education education education
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )( 9 )
Panel A: Full sample -0.297 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.039* -0.022** 0.026 0.013
[0.240] [0.008] [0.007] [0.003] [0.005] [0.020] [0.009] [0.019] [0.019]
Panel B: Within 1 point of cutoff -0.222 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.025 0.032
[0.317] [0.011] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.026] [0.011] [0.024] [0.025]
Panel C:  Within IK bounds -0.325 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.018 -0.014 0.027 0.017
[0.278] [0.010] [0.008] [0.004] [0.006] [0.023] [0.009] [0.021] [0.023]
Dependent variable
 
Note:  All regressions are clustered at the student level and include cutoff fixed effects.  All results are based on reduced form specifications where the key 
independent variable is a dummy for whether a student’s transition score is greater than or equal to the cutoff (normalized to zero). All outcome variables are at 
the child or parent level (see Section 6.4 for further discussion).  
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Figure A.1:  Top and bottom cutoffs in towns with 3 or more schools; 2-school towns 
Note: Panels A and B describe cutoffs that determine access to the best school in towns that contain at least 
three schools. Panels C and D refer to the lowest cutoffs in such towns. Panels E and F describe the cutoffs 
in two-school towns. All panels are restricted to individuals with a transition score within 0.2 points of a 
cutoff.  The left hand panels plot (0.01 point) transition cell means of the proportion of students who attend 
the school above the cutoff; the right hand side ones the proportion of students who enroll in the school 
below.  The solid lines plot fitted values of residuals from regressions of the dependent variable on a linear 
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Panel F: Cutoffs in two-school towns